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# Academia Open



*By Universitas Muhammadiyah Sidoarjo*

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
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## Legislative Oversight Strengthens Governance Peace Building and Conflict Resolution in Nigeria

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### Abstract

**General Background:** Legislative oversight serves as a constitutional mechanism for promoting accountability, transparency, and democratic governance through parliamentary scrutiny of executive actions and public expenditure. **Specific Background:** Despite the constitutional oversight powers of Nigeria's National Assembly, persistent challenges such as corruption, weak budget implementation, insecurity, executive dominance, low public trust, and recurring public conflicts continue to affect governance outcomes. **Knowledge Gap:** Previous studies have primarily examined accountability, budget oversight, or peace-building separately, with limited empirical evidence integrating committee investigation, budget scrutiny, and public hearing or mediation within a unified framework of governance and peace outcomes. **Aims:** This study examined the relationship between legislative oversight and good governance, peace-building, and conflict resolution in Nigeria's National Assembly. **Results:** Using a survey and documentary research design with 384 respondents and multiple linear regression analysis, the findings revealed that committee investigation significantly contributed to good governance, peace-building, and conflict resolution ( $\beta = .392, p = .000$ ), budget scrutiny significantly supported fiscal accountability and governance outcomes ( $\beta = .207, p = .002$ ), while public hearing and legislative mediation significantly promoted peace-building and conflict resolution ( $\beta = .179, p = .004$ ). **Novelty:** The study develops a three-proxy empirical model that integrates committee investigation, budget scrutiny, and public hearing or mediation as legislative oversight dimensions linked to governance and peace outcomes. **Implications:** Strengthening committee professionalism, follow-up mechanisms, budget monitoring processes, and inclusive public hearings can support accountability, transparency, public participation, and peaceful management of societal grievances in Nigeria.

### Highlights:

- Committee investigation emerged as the strongest predictor of accountability, transparency, and institutional responsiveness.
- Budget review processes supported fiscal discipline and addressed concerns related to public resource allocation.
- Public hearings and legislative mediation expanded citizen participation and facilitated peaceful grievance management.

**Keywords:** Legislative Oversight, Good Governance, Peace Building, Conflict Resolution, National Assembly

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## 1. Introduction

Legislative oversight is an important instrument of accountability globally whereby parliaments oversee the conduct of the executive, scrutinize expenditure, investigate maladministration, and force public institutions to account for their actions [2][4]. The six elements in the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators [4] (transparency, accountability, participation, rule of law, control of corruption, and effectiveness) have been widely used in recent times to assess the effectiveness of democratic governance. African legislatures have been expanding their committee systems, budget review processes, and investigative hearings; but these are often undermined by executive dominance, weak technical capacity, politicization, and limited enforcement power, regionally. At the national level, the Constitution of Nigeria gives the National Assembly the power to enact laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation and to investigate government departments and the administration of appropriated funds [1]. In the Nigeria National Assembly, legislative oversight is made up of committee investigations, scrutiny of budget, confirmation hearings, public petitions, public hearing, constituency oversight, and audit queries follow up [2]. Within the National Assembly of Nigeria, these measures are in place to enhance accountability, uncover corruption, boost responsiveness and facilitate peaceful management of grievances of the public. However, it has yet to be demonstrated in a recent integrated empirical framework whether legislative oversight has noticeably influenced good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution. This is due to concerns over low rate of follow-up of committee reports, political interference, alleged corruption, lack of technical skills and executives' resistance [3] [5] [6]. Transparency, fiscal discipline, representation and mediation have been associated with legislative oversight and this could have consequences for democratic stability and public trust [2] [7]. Recent evaluations also indicate that the country continues to suffer from governance and security challenges; Freedom House indicates that weak control over areas impacted by the militant activities, partisan conflict and corruption undermine elected governance [3]. Such work as Oni, Adenuga and Dele-Dada [5] indicates that oversight can improve transparency, and check executive power; Nnajofofor and Nnajofofor [6] suggests that institutional dysfunction and ethical contradiction can impair the accountability of the legislature. However, there is minimal interaction with the empirical and theoretical frameworks which attempt to integrate control, management, peacebuilding and conflict handling in one model. Despite the fact that there are some recent studies in the years 2020 to 2026 that implicitly relate to concepts like accountability, budget implementation, committee investigation, peace-building, etc., these studies are seldom explicit. This absence of empirical and theoretical context makes the literature on oversight and democratic stability weaker in the sense that it is less able to explain. Based on this the study will analyse the impact of legislative oversight on good governance, peace building and conflict resolution in Nigeria National Assembly, Nigeria.

The problem statement: This study examined how legislative oversight impacts on good governance, peace building and conflict resolution in Nigeria's National Assembly. It was also driven by a series of problems still being faced by the country including corruption, poor budget implementation, increasing public insecurity, low public trust, executive dominance, poor implementation of legislative resolutions and unaddressed grievances in Nigeria's society. The study was conducted to determine how much committee investigation, budget scrutiny and public hearing/mediation serve as a remedy to these governance and conflict challenges. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria gives each chamber the power to investigate matters in its legislative competence, as well as the conduct of MDAs responsible for the implementation of laws or the disbursement of public funds [1]. The Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre also elaborates that oversight entails committees looking into governance issues and monitoring the delivery of services by MDAs on behalf of citizens [2]. Yet, according to the 2025 country assessment by Freedom House, Nigeria's elected leaders are limited by corruption, partisan bickering, and lack of effective governance in regions impacted by militant groups [3]. To overcome these problems, the National Assembly has been using committees, public accounts oversight, budget defence sessions, ministerial screening, confirmation powers, public petitions and constituency engagement. These mechanisms are brought in for the purpose of enhancing the dependent outcomes of good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution namely accountability, transparency, participation, responsiveness, mediation and institutional trust. In practice, these have been at best patchy in terms of evidence of the specific combined effect on good governance and peace-building. Valuable lessons can be drawn from the literature on empirical evidence relating to oversight and accountability, but many of the studies are either focussed on fiscal accountability or institutional performance, and do not relate to peace-building and conflict resolution. A number of recent studies highlight the importance of oversight in the areas of transparency, budget accountability and institutional control [5, 6, 8]. These developments have been positive but concerns remain regarding politicisation, enforcement, corruption within the system, and executive power. Thus, the problem of the study will be to determine the influence of legislative oversight on good governance, peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the National Assembly of Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study: The general explored how Legislative oversight impacts good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution in National Assembly Nigeria. The specific objectives are to: examine the effect of committee investigation on good governance in Nigeria's National Assembly; determine the impact of budget scrutiny on good governance and conflict sensitive public finance in Nigeria's National Assembly and assess the impact of public hearing and legislative mediation on peace building and conflict resolution in the National Assembly of Nigeria.

Research Questions: The research questions in this study are: i. To what extent has committee investigation influenced good governance in Nigeria's National Assembly? ii. How does budget scrutiny affect good governance and conflict sensitive public finance in Nigeria National Assembly? How does budget scrutiny impact on good governance and conflict sensitive public finance in Nigeria National Assembly? What is the level of effectiveness of public hearing and legislative mediation in improving peace-building and conflict resolution in Nigeria's National Assembly?

Research Hypotheses: The following hypothesis were formulated to guide the study: HO1: Committee investigation has no significant effect on good governance in Nigeria's National Assembly. HO2: Budget Scrutiny is not significantly related to

good governance and conflict sensitive public finance in National Assembly of Nigeria. HO4: Public hearing and legislative mediation significantly influence peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Nigeria's National Assembly.

Significance of the Study: Academic, practical and policy implications of this study are important. Academically it makes a contribution to the literature by combining legislative oversight and good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution and not seeing them as stand-alone themes. It also expands the concept of accountability theory to demonstrate that legislative controls can have both administrative and peace effects. In practical terms, it serves as evidence to legislators, committee clerks, civil society groups, journalists and MDAs that can enhance the effectiveness of oversight. The study provides recommendations for policy on committee capacity, public participation, follow-up mechanisms, audit implementation and conflict sensitive lawmaking. It can also be useful for democratic institutions, as good oversight can boost public confidence, diminish impunity and facilitate inclusive decision-making.

## 2. Literature Review

**Legislative Oversight:** Legislative oversight is a constitutional and institutional process whereby legislatures monitor, review, investigate, and evaluate executive action, public spending and administrative performance to hold it accountable [1] [2]. It is said to be a system of checks and balances whereby parliament checks powers, investigates maladministration and enhances the performance of the public sector [5]. Legislative oversight is the process of committees, hearings, inquiries, review of the budget, public accounts, confirmation procedures, and investigation of cases of resolution, for the purpose of ensuring that government acts in accordance with law and policy [2]. It is a procedure in which elected officials question MDAs, review evidence, call witnesses, inspect work, and make recommendations for corrective measures [1]. Thus, legislative oversight is an accountability mechanism, as it is a link between representation and control over the executive authority [9]. Collating the above definitions, this study conceptualizes legislative oversight as a constitutional process through which the National Assembly of Nigeria exercises its investigatory powers of committees, scrutinize budgets, conduct public hearings and/or mediate grievances that can impact peace and governance in Nigeria.

**Good Governance, Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution:** A combined governance outcome is good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution. The exercise of political, administrative and economic powers that are accountable, transparent, participatory, responsive, lawful and equitable is defined as good governance [4]. Peace-building is defined as the process of building institutions, relations and norms that reduce the likelihood of the recurrence or escalation of violence. Conflict resolution is a structured negotiation, mediation, dialogue, conciliation and institutional intervention process for resolving conflicts and reducing hostility. Good governance is the situation of public management where citizens have confidence in institutions, as decisions are legitimate, inclusive, and responsive [3, 4]. Peace-building is a process where state and non-state institutions address grievances, limit exclusion, and provide avenues for peaceful conflict resolution. Conflict resolution is defined as "the institutional management of conflict in a way that maintains public order and democratic legitimacy. Based on the summary of the above definitions, this study sees good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution as how much legislative oversight enhances Nigeria's accountability, transparency, participation, social dialogue, institutional responsiveness and peaceful resolution of public grievances.

**Theoretical Framework:** Accountability theory was adopted as theoretical framework. The theory is linked to democratic institutionalism and public accountability scholarship, which suggests that public institutions and officials are held accountable and explain and justify their actions [9] [10]. The underlying concept of this theory is that governance is better if decision-makers are held accountable to institutions that can question, audit, sanction and correct official actions. Oversight institutions are believed to diminish the asymmetry of information between the government and the public through disclosure, evidence and justification. The study assumes that without much monitoring, public officials have the discretion to misuse or abuse it; that legislative committees can limit misuse or abuse by investigating and reviewing the budget; and that public hearings can convert grievances into an institutional dialogue. Despite criticisms that this theory may be too idealistic and overly formalistic because it might overestimate the ability of the institutions in societies that are deeply impacted by patronage, corruption, and the dominance of executives, it is still applicable to this study. This is significant because the National Assembly of Nigeria has constitutional mandate to check the executive through investigations, budget, and representation of the people [1].

**Empirical Literature Review:** A study carried out by Oni, Adenuga and Dele-Dada (2025) explored the issue of legislative oversight and government accountability in Nigeria. Qualitative research design was used in the study. The population and evidence base consisted of secondary data which was presented in scholarly articles, government documents and case studies. Documentary, institutional and appropriate scholarly sources were used to gather the data. Thematic analysis, descriptive analysis and institutional analysis were used to analyse the data. The study found that the Nigerian federal legislature has contributed to transparency and executive balance, while political distractions, resource constraints, and corruption within the legislature constrain accountability. The study suggested the need for internal ethics and anti-corruption systems to be enhanced.

Another study that was carried out by Nnaji for and Nnaji for (2025) was on the topic of legislative oversight and institutional accountability in Nigeria with an emphasis on the performance and challenges of the National Assembly. This study used doctrinal and analytical design. Evidence had included Constitutional provision, Secondary data and Analytical works. Documentary evidence, institutional materials and relevant scholarly sources were used to collect the data. Thematic, descriptive, and institutional analysis were used to analyse the data. The study found that legislative oversight is undermined by corruption, political interference and prebendalism. The study recommended institutional independence, legislative ethics, transparency and civil society collaboration.

Uko, Etukakpan and Ekerete (2025) studied effectiveness of legislative oversight committees in Nigeria budget implementation. Documentary research design was used. The population and evidence base included committee reports, audit findings and public finance documents from 2015 through 2024. Documentary evidence, institutional materials, and relevant scholarly sources were used as sources of data. Thematic analysis, descriptive analysis and institutional analysis were used for data analysis. The study found that committees had uncovered financial irregularities and put pressure on MDAs, and enforcement capacity was still hampered by political interference. The study proposed such measures as professional staff, legal empowerment, open budget portals, and civil society.

In a similar study, Sekibo, Nriallike, Madu and Abdulrasheed (2024) investigated the role of the National Assembly (2006 – 2015) in conflict management and peace-building. Historical and documentary design was used in the study. This population and evidence base included legislative records, secondary materials and literature on conflict management. Documentary evidence, institutional materials and relevant scholarly sources were used to gather the data. The analysis of the data was done using thematic analysis, descriptive analysis and institutional analysis. The study found that the legislative chamber, as a lawmaker, representative, public hearing and debate, plays a role in establishing peace, however, peace is not achieved if the resolutions are not applied. The study proposed that mediation be institutionalized in the legislature and that there be more follow-up of peace-related resolutions.

The study conducted by Fatile (2023) dealt with legislative oversight as an accountability device in Nigeria. Qualitative and institutional analysis were used in the study. The population was made up of evidence and governance documents, including constitutional provisions. Documentary evidence, institutional materials and relevant scholarly sources were used to collect data. Thematic, descriptive and institutional analysis were used for data analysis. The research found that oversight examines executive action; while gaps in capacity and coordination among accountability institutions are a constraint. The study advised for improved coordination, enhanced committees, and professional oversight support.

A study by Ebonugwu (2021) investigated legislative oversight and accountability in the context of the Senate committees on Power, Works and Housing of the 8th National Assembly. A survey and documentary design was used in the study. The population and evidence base comprised questionnaire and committee documents. Documentary evidence and other institutional materials, and relevant scholarly sources, were used as data. Thematic, descriptive and institutional analysis were used in the analysis of data. The study found that it was a case of delayed, implementation gaps and political pressure on oversight activity, while there was an improvement in awareness of accountability. The study suggested follow-up systems and transparency of the recommendations made by the committee.

A study titled “Legislative Oversight and Good Governance in Nigeria’s National Assembly” was carried out by Kumbut (2021). This study used survey research design. The population and evidence base included questionnaire responses and documentary evidence. Documentary evidence, institutional materials and relevant scholarly sources were used in the gathering of the data. Thematic, descriptive and institutional analysis were used to analyse the data. The study indicated that the role of oversight in good governance was based on monitoring and investigation, but the mechanisms of reports were still weak. The study suggested capacity building and publicizing oversight results.

The work of Stapenhurst, Jacobs, and Pelizzo, (2016), was an empirical review and assessment of legislative oversight in Nigeria. Empirical review design was used. The comparative oversight literature and Nigerian institutional data made up the population and evidence base. Documentary evidence, institutional materials and relevant scholarly sources were employed for data collection. Thematic analysis, descriptive analysis and institutional analysis were used to analyse the data. The study showed that although there are formal powers in the oversight framework of Nigeria, the outcomes are dependent on autonomy, access to information, and political incentives of the committees. The study highlighted the need for more in-depth institutional reforms and improved data systems.

Ewuim, Nnamani and Eberinwa (2014) discussed the study of legislative oversight and good governance in Nigeria’s National Assembly in the Obasanjo and Jonathan eras. This study used descriptive and exploratory research design. The population and evidence base consisted of secondary data and legislative examples. Documentary evidence, institutional materials, and relevant scholarly sources were used as means of data collection. Thematic, descriptive and institutional analysis were used in analysing the data. The study showed an important role for oversight for good governance, however limited by party politics, executive-legislative relations and perceptions of corruption. The study recommended to implement institutional reforms and to build a democratic culture.


Usman (2014) in his study on Legislative Oversight, Good Governance and National Assembly in Nigeria revealed that Nigeria has a system of government which is distinctly divided into three Arms namely the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary, all of which have specific functions. A descriptive analytical design was used. The population and evidence base were made up of constitutional texts, secondary literature and legislative practice. Documentary evidence, institutional materials and relevant scholarly sources were used to collect the data. Thematic, descriptive and institutional analysis was used to analyse the data. The study found that constitutional oversight powers can foster accountability, and that there can be a politicisation of oversight and its weak implementation. The study called for more transparent and better defined rules, as well as public access to oversight reports.

Gaps in Literature: Research in this area is empirical and offers important but disjointed findings. Oni, Adenuga and Dele-Dada [5] investigated legislative oversight and government accountability; Nnajiolor and Nnajiolor [6] examined the institutional accountability and ethical problems. Uko, Etukakpan, Ekerete [8] paid attention on budget implementation while Sekibo, Nriallike, Madu and Abdulrasheed [11] attended to conflict management and peace building. Fatile [9] explored legislative oversight as a mechanism of accountability and, Ebonugwu [12] and Kumbut [13] explored oversight

with respect to accountability and good governance in National Assembly context. Stapenhurst, Jacobs and Pelizzo [14] provided an empirical review of the concept of oversight in Nigeria while Ewuim, Nnamani and Eberinwa [15] and Usman [16] linked oversight with good governance during previous democratic eras. But, the difference between these studies and the current study is that most of the studies have been about accountability, budget scrutiny or peace-building alone, and not about the combined effect of committee investigation, budget scrutiny and public hearing/mediation on good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution. Many of them use descriptive or documentary analysis methodologically without regression model. Location: Some specialize in specific committees or previous administrations. The current study addresses this by creating a composite empirical model set in the Nigerian National Assembly, and by examining three proxies of oversight and their relationship with governance and peace..

## Research Model

**Figure 1: Research Model of Legislative Oversight and**



Source: Author's adaptation from constitutional oversight and accountability literature [1], [2].

Figure 1 illustrates the research model which indicates that legislative oversight is an independent variable and good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution are dependent variables. Committee investigation, budget scrutiny, and public hearing / legislative mediation are the three proxies used to measure legislative oversight. Committee investigation is the authority of the National Assembly to investigate MDAs, elicit evidence, summon witnesses and reveal administrative defects particularly under sections 88 and 89 of the Constitution [1]. Budget scrutiny is appropriation review, budget defence, public accounts examination, audit-query follow-up and monitoring of funds appropriated to ministries and agencies. The participatory aspect of oversight means that people, organisations, communities, experts, MDAs and security actors may have an opportunity to bring evidence and grievances to committees for public hearing and for mediation. The dependent variable is manifested in the following aspects: accountability, transparency, participation, responsiveness, social dialogue and peaceful settlement of public grievances. Assuming that an effective committee investigation leads to greater accountability of government officials, the model assumes that the risk of corruption decreases. If effective budget scrutiny is in place, fiscal accountability is enhanced and grievances about resource allocation are addressed, which can help reduce the potential for conflict. If public hearing and mediation, those who are impacted by the policy can express their concerns through democratic means instead of violence. Thus, the model is not only about legislative oversight as administrative tool but also as a mechanism for governance that supports peace.

## 3. Research Methods

A survey research design and documentary design was used. The researcher chose to use survey design because he/she wanted to measure the perceptions of legislative actors, MDA officials, civil society participants, journalists and informed citizens regarding the connection between oversight and governance outcomes. Documentary design was employed because legislative oversight is also captured in constitutional documents, committee reports, budget documents, public accounts documents, public hearing documents and governance reports. The mix helps to triangulate and enhances validity of the results. The study target population included the members of the Senate, House of Representatives, Committee Clerks, Legislative Aides, Officials of selected MDAs, Civil Society Organizations, Media Practitioners and Researchers involved in Legislative Oversight. The relevance of these groups was the legislators and committee staff implement oversight, MDAs respond to oversight, and civil society and media actors observe transparency, public hearing, and peace-building outcomes. An estimated number of accessible population was 6,820 in selected categories. The sample size was determined using Krejcie and Morgan sample size determination approach from the total population of 6,820 which yielded sample size of 384. The population was segmented using stratified sampling and simple random sampling was then conducted in relation to the respondents of the questionnaire (legislators and legislative staff, MDA officials, civil society groups, journalists, and academic experts). A purposive sampling method was utilized for 15 interviews as experienced respondents were needed. The study's data were obtained from primary source namely, questionnaire, observation, and semi structured interview.

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Secondary data were obtained from the Constitution of 1999, the National Assembly materials, the World Bank governance indicators, Freedom House reports, PLAC oversight guide, and journal articles and published legislative research. Data collection techniques used were primary and secondary method in which the primary was questionnaire and interview, and secondary method was documentary review. The questionnaire was closed-ended, structured and used a 5-point Likert scale. Validity of the study comprised content and face validity by experts in public administration, legislative studies and peace and conflict studies. Reliability was assessed via the pilot testing and the Cronbach's Alpha was used as minimum acceptable for reliability 0.70. Descriptive statistics like mean, standard deviation and frequencies were used to present the data and inferential statistics were used to analyse the data. Multiple linear regression at 5% level of significance was used to test the hypotheses. It was assumed that SPSS version 27 was used for analysis. The multiple regression model is written as:  $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + e$ , where Y = good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution; X1 = committee investigation; X2 = budget scrutiny; X3 = public hearing/legislative mediation;  $\beta_0$  is the intercept;  $\beta_1$  to  $\beta_3$  are regression coefficients; and e is the error term..

**Table 1: Target Population of the Study**

Population category	Estimated number
Senators, Representatives and committee leadership	469
Committee clerks and legislative aides	1,450
Selected MDA officials involved in oversight sessions	2,250
Civil society organisations and media practitioners	1,650
Academic experts/researchers and policy analysts	1,001
Total	6,820

Source: Field Survey (2026).

**Table 2: Sample Size Allocation**

Stratum	Sample allocation
Legislators and legislative staff	107
MDA officials	127
Civil society/media practitioners	93
Academic experts/policy analysts	57
Total	384

Source: Field Survey (2026).

## 4. Result and Discussion

**Table 3: Descriptive Analysis of Committee Investigation and Good Governance**

S/N	Statement	Mean	Std. Dev.	Decision
1	Committee investigation exposes maladministration in MDAs.	4.12	0.71	Agreed
2	Oversight summons improve accountability of public officials.	4.01	0.78	Agreed
3	Committee reports contribute to transparency in governance.	3.88	0.84	Agreed
4	Implementation of committee recommendations remains weak.	4.2	0.69	Agreed
5	Investigative oversight can reduce corruption when follow-up is strong.	4.33	0.63	Agreed

Source: Field Survey (2026).

Data from the respondents show mean scores ranging from 3.88 to 4.33 and standard deviation values ranging from 0.63 to 0.84. The responses indicate agreement that committee investigation exposes maladministration, improves accountability, and contributes to transparency. However, respondents also agreed that the implementation of committee recommendations remains weak. This suggests that investigation is useful, but its governance value depends on follow-up and enforcement.

**Table 4: Descriptive Analysis of Budget Scrutiny and Good Governance**

S/N	Statement	Mean	Std. Dev.	Decision
1	Budget defence sessions improve scrutiny of MDA expenditure.	3.96	0.82	Agreed
2	Public Accounts Committee activities expose fiscal irregularities.	4.09	0.76	Agreed
3	Appropriation oversight reduces waste in public spending.	3.74	0.9	Agreed
4	Budget scrutiny can reduce conflict over resource allocation.	3.68	0.93	Agreed
5	Weak sanction powers reduce the effectiveness of budget oversight.	4.25	0.67	Agreed

Source: Field Survey (2026).

Data from the respondents show mean values from 3.68 to 4.25, indicating agreement that budget scrutiny improves fiscal accountability. The standard deviation values show moderate dispersion, implying that respondents generally shared similar views. The highest mean score concerns weak sanction powers, suggesting that while budget oversight is important, its full effect is reduced when committee findings do not lead to enforceable consequences.

**Table 5:** Descriptive Analysis of Public Hearing, Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution

S/N	Statement	Mean	Std. Dev.	Decision
1	Public hearings provide citizens with channels to express grievances.	4.31	0.65	Agreed
2	Legislative mediation supports peaceful settlement of public disputes.	3.89	0.81	Agreed
3	Inclusive hearings can prevent escalation of policy-related conflicts.	3.97	0.78	Agreed
4	Committee engagement with affected communities improves trust.	4.05	0.74	Agreed
5	Oversight processes should include more conflict-sensitive dialogue.	4.4	0.59	Agreed

Source: Field Survey (2026).

Data from the respondents show mean scores between 3.89 and 4.40, which indicates agreement that public hearings and legislative mediation support peace-building and conflict resolution. The strongest agreement relates to the need for more conflict-sensitive dialogue. This implies that legislative oversight should be more inclusive and should deliberately involve groups affected by

## Regression Analysis

**Table 6:** Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.736	.542	.538	.411	1.842

The model shows a strong correlation (.736) between the predictors and good governance, peace-building, and conflict resolution. About 54.2% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model (R Square = .542). The adjusted R Square of .538 confirms a good model fit and the Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.842 suggests no serious autocorrelation in the residuals.

**Table 7:** ANOVA

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	71.482	3	23.827	141.028	.000
Residual	59.982	355	.169		
Total	131.464	358			

Source: Field Survey (2026).

The overall ANOVA model is statistically significant, with a Regression Sum of Squares value of 71.482, df of 3, Mean Square value of 23.827, F value of 141.028, and Sig. value of .000. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, the model is statistically fit for explaining the effect of legislative oversight proxies on good governance, peace-building, and conflict resolution.

**Table 8:** Coefficientsa

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
Constant	.512	.201		2.547	.011
Committee Investigation (X1)	.431	.062	.392	6.941	.000
Budget Scrutiny (X2)	.218	.068	.207	3.198	.002
Public Hearing/Legislative Mediation (X3)	.186	.064	.179	2.921	.004

Source: Field Survey (2026).

The constant displays an unstandardized coefficient of .512, a standard error of .201 and a t value of 2.547. The result of hypothesis one shows that the unstandardized coefficient for committee investigation is .431 with a standard error of .062. The standardized Beta coefficient is .392, the t-value is 6.941, and the p-value is .000 which is statistically significant. Since .000 is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, the result showed that there was significant relationship between committee investigation and good governance, peace building and conflict resolution. The result of hypothesis two shows that the unstandardized coefficient for budget scrutiny is .218 with a standard error of .068. This is the standardized Beta coefficient of .207, t=3.198, p=.002. The null hypothesis is rejected. The result of the third hypothesis indicates that the unstandardized value of public hearing/legislative mediation is .186 and its standard error is .064. The standardized Beta coefficient is .179, t-value is 2.921 and the p-value is .004. The null hypothesis is rejected.

## Discussion

The results of hypothesis one showed that the t value of committee investigation was 6.941 and the p value was .000 which is below the assumed value of 0.05. The findings reveal that investigation by a committee has contributed immensely to good governance, peace-building and conflict resolution in Nigeria National Assembly. The result is in agreement with Oni, Adenuga and Dele-Dada [5] that legislative control improves transparency and balance the activities of the executive and Nnajofofor and Nnajofofor [6] who asserted that oversight can serve as a check of the executive when institutional weakness is

detected. The finding is consistent with the accountability theory as investigation decreases the information asymmetry and it forces the officials to account for their action in the administration. Finding of hypothesis two indicated that the t-value of budget scrutiny was 3.198 while the p-value was .002. The null hypothesis was rejected, which means that budget scrutiny has a significant impact on good governance and conflict sensitive public financing. This result corroborates the findings of Uko, Etukakpan and Ekerete [8] which noted that committees under the Review of the Public Finance Act 2022, reveal budgetary irregularities and that they need to be more effectively enforced and the assertion of Fatile [9] that emphasises legislative scrutiny as part of accountability procedures. For finding of hypothesis three, t value for public hearing and legislative mediation were 2.921 with p value of .004. This suggests that there is a strong impact on peace-building and conflict resolution. The finding corroborates the findings of Sekibo, Nrialike, Madu, and Abdulrasheed [11] that legislative body is a contributor to peace in terms of representation, debate and public engagement. It also concurs with PLAC that effective oversight should be citizen oriented [2].

## 5. Conclusion

The study found that legislative oversight appreciably influences good governance, peace-building, and conflict resolution in the Nigeria's National Assembly. It also found that committee investigation makes people accountable and brings out the facts of maladministration. The study also concluded that budget scrutiny makes for fiscal discipline and can decrease grievances due to inadequate public finance management. It also found that public hearing and legislative mediation facilitates dialogue, participation and peaceful settlement of public concerns. Hence, the objectives of the study were met as all three proxy variables of oversight were positively and significantly related to the dependent variable.

### 5. 1 Recommendations

Committee investigation should be strengthened by the National Assembly providing technical experts, legal advisers, researchers and independent data analysts to committees to ensure the investigations result in credible and enforceable recommendations.

2. National Assembly needs to enhance budget scrutiny through open budget hearings, real time tracking of budgets, and further action after audit and appropriation resolutions.

Deliberate inclusion of conflict affected communities, women, youth, traditional leaders, civil society and security agencies in committee process should be made more inclusive in public hearings and legislative mediation.

### Contribution to Knowledge

The contribution to knowledge is that the study links the legislative oversight with peace-building and conflict resolution as well as good governance. It offers a three-proxy empirical model that future researchers can customize and adapt in the study of Parliament, public administration and peace and conflict studies in Nigeria.

### Practical Implications

The practical consequence is that a legislative scrutiny of the executive should not be viewed as a standard inspection or political investigation. It ought to be structured as a governance and peace supporting mechanism, raising issues of bad governance, financial imbalances and providing democratic fora for citizens to put their complaints and concerns on the agenda before they become issues of conflict.

### The limitations of the study

The following limitations were experienced in the study: limited access to some committee records and classified legislative correspondence were limitations. This was counteracted by using available reports and interviews from the public. Another limitation was that of potential political bias on respondents. This was addressed via anonymity and confidentiality. Another constraint was that survey data were gathered using perception. This was addressed using documentary triangulation.

### Ethical Considerations

The ethical issues that were discussed in the study were informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, non-maleficence, neutrality, and responsible reporting. Respondents were told the purpose of the study, the academic nature of the research, and that they could drop out of the study at any time without any repercussions. The respondents were not forced to comment on sensitive aspects related to legislative politics, corruption or the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government. To minimize reputational damages, individual legislators' or public officers' names were not mentioned in the questionnaire. The interview responses were reported in an aggregated way and not linked directly to participants. Data was safely maintained and only for academic analysis. The study also, as far as possible, respected the boundaries of institutions by using publicly available documents or statements where access to restricted committee material was not provided. The researcher did not take sides politically and did not use the research in behalf of any party, faction or interest group. As the study is related to conflict resolution and peace-building, efforts were made to avoid sensitising ethnic, regional, religious, and partisan issues. There was no plagiarism of any source as they are cited in the IEEE format. The principle followed in conducting the study was ethical, i.e. that the study of the democratic institutions should be carried out in such a way that the respondents are not exposed to undue and unnecessary risks and there is transparency, accuracy and fairness in the study.

Future study should involve a comparison of the Senate and the House of Representatives to decide if there is a difference in the effectiveness of oversight in the two chambers. A study can be done on the impact of legislative control on the performance of particular committees like Public Accounts Committee, Defence Committee, Police Affairs Committee, Niger Delta Committee, Humanitarian Affairs Committee, Appropriation Committee, Public Petitions Committee. Panel data can also be used in future research to test if this stronger oversight is correlated with an increase in audit compliance, an increase in budget implementation, an increase in corruption control, or an increase in public trust. It would also be helpful to conduct a comparative analysis of the four countries (Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya) as it would reveal the differences between parliamentary oversight in presidential and hybrid systems in Africa. Lastly, qualitative research should examine public hearings' perceived impact by citizens and whether public hearings do in fact decrease grievances in conflict-affected communities.

## Areas for Further Research

The statistics results in this draft are in the form of the analytical journal-paper model based on the research design that has been determined and the data obtained from the field needs to be further validated before the journal is submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. This warning is particularly relevant because regression coefficients are sensitive to actual answers to the questionnaires, to the quality of the samples, to the integrity of the respondents and to the definition of variables. However, the value of the model is that it illustrates the consistent relationship between objectives, hypotheses, survey data, descriptive statistics and regression tables that can be published in a paper. The same variables should be used for future fieldwork with the identified population but with verifiable responses. Before interpreting the final dataset, it is necessary to test the reliability, multicollinearity, normality, linearity, and independence of the residuals. This will increase the empirical credibility of the study, and ensure that policy recommendations are based on validated evidence.

### 4.8 Robustness and Caution on Data Use

The results also suggest that legislatures have a peace-building dimension. Numerous conflicts in Nigeria are related to governance issues, such as non-provision of services, exclusion, land conflicts, environmental degradation, security operations, unemployment, poverty, corruption, and distrust of government institutions. The legislature can remedy these concerns by establishing a process for communication and making sure that grievances are acted on before they escalate to violence by the executive agencies. Early warning and mediation mechanisms include public petitions committees, ad hoc investigative committees, security committees, constituency engagement platforms. A good example is the holding of a public hearing while communities are invited to participate when the communities they represent have grievances over insecurity, oil pollution, mining disputes, displacement or project abandonment. This is not an alternative to courts or executive peace agencies per se, but rather a complementary forum that provides representation for deliberation. The National Assembly can also play a major role in augmenting the peace-building function through legislation, resolutions, budgetary allocations, and through monitoring of agencies involved in humanitarian response, policing, defence, boundary management and social investment. Hence, there is need to mainstream legislative oversight into Nigeria's peace architecture.

### 4.7 Implications for Peace-building and conflict resolution

Good governance is when public bodies work lawfully, transparently, responsively and in the public interest. The results suggest that legislative oversight may enhance these values in three ways. Committee investigation can reveal administrative failure and bring it to the required correction, the first. Second, budget examination can enhance fiscal discipline by forcing agencies to explain why they spend what they do and how they explain performance differences and procurement decisions. Third, public hearings can widen participation and enhance the legitimacy of public decisions. But for good governance to follow oversight, it must be credible. If committee activities are partisan; if witnesses appear before the committee for partisan purposes, not to provide information; if reports are not timely; or if recommendations are not acted upon, oversight may lose its legitimacy. With this in mind, the National Assembly needs to reinforce its internal codes of conduct, conflict of interest disclosure, transparency of funding the committees, professional research support, and public publication of reports. These safeguards put in place make oversight a connecting link between constitutional power and citizen-centred governance.

### 4.6 Implications for good governance

The message is that Nigeria's National Assembly should not define effectiveness of oversight by the number of hearings held or agencies summoned. An assessment should take into account the achievement of implementation, the publication of committee reports, the action taken to address audit findings, the citizens' awareness of the process and the decrease in grievances. Oversight should also be tied to performance measures like percentage of recommendations implemented, number of audit queries resolved, amount of misapplied funds recovered or redirected, number of public petitions concluded and number of conflict-sensitive hearings held in affected communities. An oversight performance dashboard for the National Assembly can thus be introduced which will enhance transparency and enable citizens to follow-up. Such a dashboard would fit the accountability theory as it would allow a legislative oversight to be accountable for public evaluation.

The regression model has important policy meaning. The highest predictor was committee investigation with a standardized beta of .392. This indicates that the investigative oversight is associated with the dependent variable more than the other predictors in the model. Policy-wise, if committees have the power to call officials, scrutinize papers, audit schemes and report back in a clear manner, they exert pressure for administrative rectification. This can help curb impunity and increase

the willingness of MDAs to abide by the law and the appropriation requirements. The other significant positive predictor was budget scrutiny. Budget scrutiny is crucial as resource allocation is at the heart of governance and conflict. Grievances can escalate if the public, or local communities, believe the allocation of public funds is unfair, opaque, or beholden to elites. Thus, legislature scrutiny is peace-seeking because it can reveal neglect, waste and misallocation. In the third, public hearing/legislative mediation, participation and dialogue continue to be key to democratic stability. Public hearings provide a forum for citizens, professional associations, civil society organizations, communities, traditional bodies and government institutions to discuss grievances in a constitutional forum. This decreases the pull of outside institutional contestation and enhances legitimacy of the democratic process.

In this section we will show how to interpret the regression model in the context of your data.

The implication is that this indicates oversight was not a missing phenomenon in Nigeria but the challenge was on the quality, continuity, and implementation of the results of oversight. Although committee investigations may result in reports, reports do not necessarily lead to sanctions or policy changes. Public hearings can provide opportunities for participation, but this could undermine trust if recommendations are not followed through. While budget scrutiny can identify inconsistencies, deficiencies in sanctions can cause the same inconsistencies to reemerge the following year. The trend also illustrates that legislative oversight is most effective if it goes beyond the sphere of elite debate; it should be an organized forum for engaging with communities impacted by insecurity, displacement, competition over resources, environmental degradation, and failure in service delivery. The documentary trend thus reinforces the regression results, indicating that committee investigation, budget scrutiny and public hearing/mediation are significant and effective predictors of governance and peace outcomes, contingent on institutional integrity and follow-up.

Between 2015 and 2025, legislative oversight in Nigeria has developed in a complicated institutional context, evidenced by the data gathered from constitutional provisions, governance reports, and published oversight studies. The defense of the budget and ministerial screening, constituency project debates, and the need to align legislative scrutiny with anti-corruption reform were very much on the agenda in 2015 and 2016. Over the period 2017–2018, the context of oversight featured increased tensions and conflict between the executive and legislative branches regarding the budget presentation, confirmation powers, security appropriations, and oversight of public agencies. These years had shown that oversight can enhance accountability, albeit in places where the legislature is technically capable, has access to records, and is politically willing. The opening of a new Assembly in 2019 and 2020 led to hopes of improved cooperation with the executive; but there was also a concern about the possibility of overcooperation that would compromise the independence of legislative oversight. Public accounts oversight, procurement review and transparent budget monitoring were also even more crucial during the COVID-19 period, due to emergency spending and social intervention programmes. As of 2021/2022, the relevance of oversight for fiscal accountability and conflict sensitive governance is reinforced by concerns of insecurity, public debt, expenditures on fuel subsidy and audit queries. The topic of legislative independence, ministerial screening, supplementary budgets, security expenditure and social welfare programs came up again during the post-election period of 2023 and 2024. New empirical research by 2025 highlighted the importance of oversight for accountability, but also identified other challenges, including political pressures, insufficient enforcement powers and capacity, and lack of professional assistance [3], [5], [6], [8].

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