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
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Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Union 1994 (PCA): Perjanjian Kemitraan dan Kerja Sama antara Federasi Rusia dan Uni Eropa 1994 (PCA)

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Abstract

General Background: The post–Cold War international system created new frameworks for cooperation between major actors. **Specific Background:** The 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Union established a legal and institutional basis for political dialogue, economic cooperation, and coordination. **Knowledge Gap:** Limited understanding exists regarding how such legal frameworks function in practice and their ability to sustain long-term strategic partnerships under changing geopolitical conditions. **Aims:** This study analyzes the origins, provisions, and outcomes of the agreement using historical and analytical methods. **Results:** The findings show that the agreement successfully structured bilateral relations, institutionalized dialogue, and supported economic interaction, but failed to achieve a comprehensive strategic partnership due to conflicting interests and external pressures. **Novelty:** The study combines historical context with analytical evaluation to assess both the strengths and structural limitations of the agreement. **Implications:** The results highlight the complexity of sustaining international partnerships and provide insights into the evolving nature of EU–Russia relations in a dynamic global system.

Keywords: Partnership Agreement, EU Russia Relations, International Cooperation, Political Dialogue, Economic Integration

Key Findings Highlights

Institutional mechanisms established for continuous bilateral engagement

Long-term cooperation maintained despite shifting geopolitical conditions

Strategic alignment constrained by competing national interests

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1. Introduction:

With the conclusion of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system was transformed as it had been after World War II. This development helped in reconfiguring the systemic structure of international relations and paved way for new modes of political economic interaction. From this perspective, the Russian Federation presented itself as a legal successor to the Soviet Union intending to regain its place in international system and build symmetrical relationships with regional and global leaders; both among them European Union.

On its end, the European Union was moving quickly to deepen its internal integration and extend both political and commercial influence into Eastern Europe -a strategic vacuum left behind by the collapse of Warsaw Pact. Amid this relative convergence of interests, a space emerged for establishing a legal and institutional framework to regulate relations between the two parties and also define areas and mechanisms for their cooperation.

It has been this respect that partnership and Cooperation agreement signed in 1994 is regarded as one of the key instruments to promote relations based on some degree of a political dialogue, economic cooperation and institutional coordination. This was a first step in what may become an arc of strategic alliances that respect sovereignty, encourage democratic frameworks for governance, and expand development through operations expanding the tenure opened up by trade liberalization.

It is not merely a treaty between states, it was rooted in the new rules of international relations established after what we once called the Cold War. This nexus of political will and economic desire, formed from without (but at least in part through transformation within Russia) but not all by any means uninfluenced externally — both as a consequence either of European enlargement along with changes on the broader international security landscape.

Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Russian Federation and European Union from a generalized analytical perspective. It speaks to the prelude before marking it, conditions of its execution and substantive articles and targets on which it is based as well as an evaluation of production figured out by her demonstrating whether a mutually beneficial sustainable arrangement between both sides has been reached or not.

It is relevant because it poses one of the most comprehensive experiences along how to structure relationships between a power hub and an area where regional group maintains. That also sheds light the historical underpinnings of modern Russian-European relations that echo through out international system.

One: The Russian–European Relations Introductory Framework

The relations are comprised of a historical stage before the 1994 Agreement, appropriate for each pompous association. The Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Soviet Union on 18 December 1989. This agreement constituted the first legally binding basis for bilateral relations. (<https://edit.wti.org/document/show/db45b321-9b40-448e-b219-5a844734dbbd>) When the Soviet Union fell apart in December 1991, its successor state — Russian Federation — was forced to rethink and redefine its place in world politics. Russia who had inherited the permanent seat of Soviet Union in United Nations Security Council needed international legitimization and integration into newly emerging European order as transitional economy state. Therefore, Moscow strived to revive its role as comparable power center via partnership instead of clash (Abdul Jabbar Ismail Ibrahim 2023:246).

The foreign policy of the Yeltsin presidency is perhaps best understood as an effort to rebuild Russia's ties with Europe and link it back into world affairs after a long period (1960s–1980s) during which Soviet politics had put Moscow in relative isolation. At this time in Russia, the Atlanticist policy was born — a foreign-policy course of strengthening economic and political ties with Western countries using international institutions to gain acceptance from such organizations as NATO and EU. This has put the European Union at the center of Russian strategy, thanks to its economic features and geographical proximity (Ashraf et al., 2015; Walid Mahmoud Ahmed n. d.:320).

The reciprocal diplomatic visits of both the sides also increased during this period. Russia has tried to edify the European economic transition experience by market-oriented reforms and inviting foreign investments in preconceptive process. Yet, this orientation was not without its difficulties and Russia struggled to preserve independence of politics alongside the demands required for rapprochement with West. In addition, with the European states on security and political grounds—on NATO's eastwards expansion (John Joseph Mearsheimer 1990:7).

Still, even amid all these troubles the doctrine promoted by Yeltsin has led to establishing the first foundations for a lasting relationship between Russia and the European Union — despite difficulties it was marked by signing of so-called Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994 that had been laying down legal basis for concentrating at least some efforts on managing those relations. Thus, the Yeltsin era can be considered a formative period in Russian–European relations where Russia moved from adversary to partner (albeit still with needs limited by internal changes and external power balances).

It was the first official visit of Soviet President Boris Yeltsin to Germany after collapse of Soviet Union на 21 November 1991. While there, he conferred in Bonn with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on priority areas of Russian–Ukrainian relations as well cash-strapped Russia's piled-up debts and pressing financial issues. The Volga Germans and the release case of Erich Honecker from a Chilean embassy in Moscow were also on meeting's agenda. They hailed the meeting as the beginning of a new "special relationship" between Yeltsin and Kohl, which persisted into the 1990s in a manner that became one of foundations for Russian–European relations. Certainly, Kohl — who notably was the first western leader to welcome Boris Yeltsin after the collapse of what he called 'the evil empire' — set the stage for mutual trust. (<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/helmut-kohl-transcripts-engaging-gorbachev-and-yeltsin>).

Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister visited Brussels on 9–11 March 1992 to attend a meeting of the North Atlantic Council of NATO. It was during this visit that Kozyrev met with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and the foreign ministers of other member states in European Community. Topics included peacekeeping in Yugoslavia and arms control issues. It symbolised the first of few Russian–European ministerial meetings and enabled formal negotiations for a new legal structure (<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/secretary/belgium>).

In the spring of 1992, formal negotiations began on an economic agreement between Russia and the European Union. This development occurred within a significant strategic context, as the European Union was preparing to establish its single market by the end of 1992, a move that would enhance its economic capabilities and render it a more important trading partner for post-Soviet Russia (Mark A. Smith, 2004, p. 2). These negotiations constituted the practical starting point of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, as provisions relating to bilateral trade, investment, and economic cooperation were actively discussed. On 15 December 1992, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Zavidovo. The meeting focused on urgent financial issues and the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany in 1994. During the meeting, Boris Yeltsin expressed his disappointment over the low revenues generated from the sale of former Soviet properties in East Germany. In response, Helmut Kohl indicated that the rescheduling of Russia's debts would cost Germany alone an estimated 8 billion Deutsche Marks. He also emphasized the extensive environmental damage caused by former Soviet forces in East Germany. (<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/helmut-kohl-transcripts-engaging-gorbachev-and-yeltsin>).

All of this coincidentally fell into the backdrop of a vital diplomatic mission that took place in Moscow when, on November 18, 1993. During this visit, Delors talked of a wide ranging economic agreement with Russian leaders and also officially invited president Boris Yeltsin to come to Brussels on 9 December 1993. During the course of this visit, an important step was taken for what has been labelled by EU as a "New European Strategy" in December 1992 which envisaged signing "Partnership Agreements" with states succeeding Soviet Union (Aleshnick & Rappoport; United Press International, 1993).

In addition, from 12 – 15 January, 1994 the US President Bill Clinton met in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin at an important bilateral summit (United Press International, 1994). At that summit, the two leaders signed a trilateral deal with Ukraine regarding nuclear weapons (Trilateral Statement). It included an official dinner at Yeltsin's state dacha and long bilateral talks. Anthony Lake, the national security adviser then in charge of building a new foreign policy for Clinton described Yeltsin as "perhaps your most significant foreign counterpart" (Asharq Al-Awsat 2023). That summit helped steer Russian–Western relations towards signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in Corfu.

No 2: The Signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994

On 24 June 1994, a summit was held in Corfu on the sidelines of European Council meetings which took place on this Greek island. This summit was a major step towards restructuring post Cold War European relations, with respect to Russia (Murad Faisal, 2016:36). It was in this context that Russia signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: just one day before its signing, it entered into NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program (European Council, 1994). At that time, this development mirrored a Russian desire for ever-closer ties with European and Atlantic institutions. (<https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/partnership-for-peace-programme>).

At the Corfu Summit, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and then leaders of European Union member states signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The ceremony was attended by also Jacques Delors -President of the European Commission. Leading up to and during the summit, Boris Yeltsin's statements illustrated Russia's desire for admission to Europe: The agreement was only a first step in building an engagement of Russia into the European sphere that should lead both sides towards mutual economic and political cooperation. The Moscow Times (1994) reported that when he arrived in Corfu, the treaty was "the most landmark document towards creating an equal and partnership-based bilateral relations [and ending] a state of discrimination between our countries since World War II or even earlier time... 14 years after Cold War".

It was formally signed in June 1994 and entered into effect in 1997 for a period of ten years, thus establishing an enforceable legal framework regulating relationships between the two sides (Blockmans, 2008: p.169).

Russian–European Union Partnership and Cooperation Agreement serves as one all-embracing legal arrangements of 11 higher-level titles containing 112 articles in total. It set the stage for a more consolidated structure governing different facets of the bilateral relationship. In addition to provisions on investment and capital movement liberalization, these titles lay out general

principles based on respect for democracy and human rights; establish regular political dialogue channels between partners; regulate trade in goods under market rules. The deal also has provisions on competition and intellectual property rights as well as economic cooperation, illegal trafficking and cultural-scientific cooperation. It ends with an institutional mechanism supporting the creation of a Cooperation Council and joint committees that will supervise implementation, which demonstrates its long-term institutional nature (Council of the European Union 1997).

Russian foreign policy thinking towards Europe since the beginning of 1990s was based on a belief that it could be an area for partnership and cooperation—not only from economic, political and security perspective but also because Russia has always had historical ties to Western European cultures. Differences in such perceptions also fueled Russia's pursuit of its institutional cooperation with the West. Moscow began talking about joining NATO since 1991 as part of its wider discourse on security partnerships and considered rapprochement with the EU through political and economic cooperation programs. These Policies were turned into actual steps, specifically (Lama Mudhar Al-Amara 2009, Page: 122):

1994 — The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia the European Union, provides for regulation of political issues as well economic relations through institutional cooperation.

Russia's joining the Council of Europe in 1996, as a way to further cement its commitment to democratic values and human rights; with multilateral European institutions.

The signing of agreements on a basis for cooperation, mutual relations and security with NATO in 1997 (which also established dialogue mechanisms including the NATO–Russia Council).

At this point, Russia's strategic thinking has transformed into a common vision for foreign policy decision-making; creation of a shared energy market and a single regulatory space at the same time developing an interactive system where cultural-educational-social mutual presence should be mainly in focus. Even when there have been strong incentives among all parties, reluctance was the main feature shaping positions of Russian political elites then both in reference to other orientations within international policy of Russia and with regard to project yourself European political elicits (Talib Hussein Hafiz 2009:18).

Third: Provisions of the Agreement

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1994 between the Russian Federation and the European Union constituted a comprehensive legal framework for regulating bilateral relations in the post–Cold War era. This agreement involved a number of provisions to improve collaboration in the political, economic and institutional arenas designed for stability and phased integration between both parties.

1. Political Provisions

Relations between the Russian Federation and European Union are built on a framework consisting of in particular political provisions laid down in the 1994 Agreement. The Agreement provides for the establishment of an institutional framework to hold regular political dialogue between both sides, in order to enable a convergence on international issues and promote firm relations based upon ongoing collaboration and coordination. This discourse is viewed as one of the instruments that will underpin Russia's political and economic metamorphoses through its pivotal role in improving security, cohesion and stability throughout Europe (Partnership & Co-operation Agreement 1994 Art.

It also guaranteed that respect for democracy and human rights is an important component of the partnership. These principles serve as the foundation of both domestic and foreign policy for each party, clearly illustrating its normative dimension in these relationships (Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 1994 Art.

The political provisions were also designed to pull Russia closer to Europe and the world through increased coordination in foreign policy, more contacts on global issues, and greater cooperation within international organizations towards gradual convergence of both sides (Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 1994 Article 1).

..2 Economic Provisions

The economic dimension was at the core of the 1994 Agreement and it aimed to expand bilateral trade between Russia and EU, while establishing mutual investments on distinct institutionalised foundations (Sergunin & Atanasov – June / July 2010)13. Of a profit period that every development guarantee must be performed and executed as per the essentials of this market, advancement for an appealing up-and-comers with work division while obligations stockpiling can not trespass exceedingly unreasonable in on propelling intercessions. Sustainable solutions highlighted the need to build collaborative trade relations that create prosperity for generations, not short-term exchanges.

The agreement itself also stated that, The establishment of a future free-trade area would be worth considering with the aim of securing economic integration and trade in goods/services but without liberalising markets for either side (Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 1994 article1).

With respect to the economic side of things: both sides pledged favorable conditions for MFN treatment vis-à-vis other traded goods and services which is one key component of non-discrimination among products ensuring measures that do no harm upon each other creating streams of trade through unrestricted access. The

reciprocal commitment reflects the willingness of both sides to preserve a stable and reasonable trade environment for investors and producers. So was the concept of good governance language in this agreement coupled with international trade rules, particularly General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), specifying that both parties engaged to internationally acknowledged standards along laws for transparentness as well as credibility towards their business purchases (Agreement 1994: article10).

Set against this backdrop was the context of Russia's economic transition in the immediate years after the Soviet Union disintegrated, and an agreement to support Russian movement into a modern market place. This meant pushing through economic reforms, creating a better business environment to foster the private sector and attract international direct investment; this also included promoting technology transfer from EU into Russia. Initiative is further emphasized by challenges to reform and modernize the Russian economy, integrate it under conditions conducive of sustainability-based incremental stabilization (in accordance with Article 1) into a world economic system without long-term reliance on traditional sources in favor of fundamental state dominance.

Economic provisions also provided additional control over the conduct of economic activity. It reiterated the principle of freedom of transit between both sides without with no unreasonable impediment because it related to goods, which provides for speedy delivery. It even addressed the regulation of internal taxation, providing that imported products may not be taxed in a greater amount than similar goods originating from inside an area on terms compatible with fair competition principles. Such measures are intended to insure a level playing field of competition which will give investors and producers equal opportunities while ensuring fair trade competition between the parties, European products vs Russian (Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 1994- Articles 11–12)

3. Institutional Provisions

The 1994 Agreement created an obvious outline full of institutional coherence which aimed to dictate the way relations between the Russian Federation and indeed even European Union would be regulated. Military Military Affairs Cooperation as a broader umbrella under which to conduct the establishment of day-to-day mechanisms at the highest political levels such that того это как гэта Политический party, campaign ministerial-f-on-Military officiation (наведение прав на понятия!). This institutional arrangement reflects the both sides having made a deliberate push towards expeditious consolidation of bilateral relations to at least in-principle core levels, and deliberately avoiding ad hoc or relatively undisciplined approaches to sensitive political issues. At last, it enhances capacities to deal with conflicts and resolve disputes through institutional mechanisms while providing a stable venue for information-exchange as well as practical joint decision-making (APC Article 7).

Moreover, the agreement created a multilevel framework for institutional interaction that encompassed senior official level meetings; established diplomatic channels to facilitate back-to-back discussions including in specialized areas like economics, trade energy and social affairs. This is such an adaptable system in the sense that it allows for issues to be addressed with standards, level of formality or indeed professionals before rising through the ranks politically over time while keeping a constant and effective manner. This institutional nature points to the sign that both sides are aware of the fact that substantive political discussions needs to be twined with a rhythmic follow-up mechanism in order to drive reduction going on between high-level negotiations (which often come about at moment animus; see e.g. 1994 Article 8 Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation)

Parliamentary Dimension

On the parliamentary level, it envisioned mechanisms of cooperation development between European Parliament and Russian Parliament which included establishment of joint committees and periodic meetings to strengthen democratization as well would have eased out institutional communication between two sides. This parliamentary aspect aims at enhancing mutual appreciation of the laws and policies regulating bilateral ties and allowing for legislative institutions to take part in exercising oversight over how this agreement would be put into practice, as well send suggestions. It further serves to improve transparency and accountability, adding a level of balance in the bilateral relationship beyond executive or political dialogue towards parliament-to-parliament cooperative exchange through mutual exchanges and oversight, which embodies the democratic dimension of this partnership (Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 1994:Article9).

Fourth: Objectives and Principles of the Agreement

Article 1 established key economic objectives of the agreement: provision, at that time appropriate in a framework for dialogue based on trust and effective cooperation; sustainable development through support there to trade & investment both with principles ought be market economics intensification edition facilitate coherence by substantive economy relation amplifying freedom adamant issue, supporting Russia's death comprehensive transition zeros outstretched orthodox between prepared purport future free designate area reducing once implement command nebulous apart furnished — (Official Journal) European Union.

However, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) did not attain volume of complete free trade agreements; therefore it can be considered as a preferential cooperation agreement (Cihelková 2007: 243). As a practical matter, this classification was reflected in provisional measures that reduced certain customs duties on imports from Russia, as well as enhanced protection of intellectual property rights. In addition, both parties were granted the right to a so-called 'emergency clause' that allowed them, in cases of quantitative or other kinds

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of dumping causing material injury to domestic producers, to implement measures for import protection—again especially relevant where sectors fell under European Economic Community regulation (Arbatova 2006:106).

The main economic advantage of the agreement was in lifting quantitative obstacles to imports from its then components, which had already been effectively imposed prior to dissolution (in practice laying down a self-inflicted embargo on goods supplied) and hence through being mutually preferential for business and investment under cooperation arrangements across several fields ranging from services – capital flows-intellectual property alignment legislative-economic congruence-research-development technology education energy environment transport communications. Compared to stabilization and association agreements concluded by the EU with other Balkan countries (Cihelková, 2003, p.620), this agreement did not result in full customs tariff elimination within its scope even though it was relatively important from the perspective of external relations economic framework of European integration process on higher level at an aggregative stage whereat bigger changes are happening. Also the deal was not decisive on liberalizing trade completely in goods, persons, services and capital. Furthermore, the non-EU status has been over years progressively considered as being tantamount to the basic trade preferences conferred by partners (Brabant, 1998: 1).

Parliamentary cooperation framework was the first institutional pillar to create an economic base for EU-Russia relations. Bilateral relations are characterized by twice yearly summits of heads of state and government to set out the general strategic direction. It moreover allows meetings of relevant ministers, depending on the issues at hand - for example those from foreign affairs, justice and interior or energy, transport here as well as environment. The European Parliament and the Russian parliament (State Duma, Federation Council) have periodic meetings of their own Parliamentary Cooperation Committee to exchange views on the current economic situation. This is supplemented by the holding of meetings of senior officials and experts to discuss more technical issues (European Commission/EU, 2007). Buying undecided votes: Regular consultations are done over wider issues like protection of human rights, however these frameworks have a more political character with limited capacity to speak on economic matters (Hnát & Cihelková p. 55).

Given that the Cooperation Council has only the authority to issue non-binding recommendations, the development of the Permanent Partnership Council system required the conclusion of additional agreements between the European Union and Russia. These agreements took the form of sectoral arrangements based on the treaties of the European Community and Euratom, initially covering textile trade and later expanding to include steel, science and technology, nuclear safety and fusion, visa facilitation, and readmission. The steel and textile sectors were among the most prominent areas covered by bilateral trade agreements, which were expected to expire upon Russia's full accession to the World Trade Organization (Blockmans, 2008, p. 169).

Fifth: Results of the Agreement

The 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the Russian Federation and the European Union delivered several pivotal results which determined in general outline relations of parties during post-Cold War period.

One of the results was a framework for cooperation between two countries based on mutual postulation. It served as the core document which set rules for cooperation situations between Russia and EU, including political steps in these economy spheres. This established an undisputed institutional character to the relationship, following international changes that came with the break-up of the Soviet Union (RT News Agency 2012)

The deal further laid foundation for close cooperation and regular political dialogue between the two sides. It was set up mechanisms for consultation and the exchange of views on international issues, making political dialogue one of the main pillars that are at foundation relationship Co-operative and providing a basis for coordinating positions to address many areas common concern (RT News Agency:2014). Perhaps even more important is the fact that for many years after the agreement, it remained as the main document regulating Russian-European relations. Even in the face of political and economic transformations, it continued to fulfil this purpose well into October 2013 demonstrating its relevance as a legal and political point of reference guiding bilateral relations (RT News Agency, 2014).

In addition, developments in relations between the two sides also indicated that although the agreement was an important achievement, it started to become inadequate for new changes gradually. Consequently, Russia and the EU started negotiations on a new generation of agreement that led to their framework from 2008 onwards due to changing international conditions (Al Jazeera Net, 08).

According to the content of the agreement, it has regulated various fields of cooperation especially economic commercial and political. But it was limited to broad frameworks and did not culminate in full integration, characteristic of a regulatory agreement aimed at ordering relations rather than establishing an institutional or economic union between the two parties. (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/partnership-and-cooperation-agreements-pcas-russia-the-southern-caucasus-and-central-asia.html>)

Conclusion

As far as the presentation and analysis provided in this paper are concerned, it seems that 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russian Federation on one side of a negotiating table is an important breakthrough moment in relations development between official Brussels and Moscow. It laid down a

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formal and institutional foundation for governmental controls over political economic exchanges, as well as helped to open avenues of dialogue on cooperation after decades of ideological isolationism from one another.

In the study, it shows that this agreement appears against a backdrop characterized by some optimism about whether there can be built more constructive international order. But meanwhile Russia was interested in being integrated into the world economics and regarding that, European Union wanted just what it requires: stability and more territory. However, these objectives were confronted by a multifaceted structural landscape of conflicting strategic visions and interests — combined with the adverse effects associated with geopolitical developments such as eastward EU-NATO enlargement.

Moreover, the latter study also confirmed that its provisions are not sufficient to establish a real strategic partnership — even though extensive and complete. The connection between language and reality was still mediated through things broader than the legal text: most importantly, domestic political developments in Russia itself; gradual changes over time to European security preferences or international system dynamics. At the level of results, it resulted in some progress on financial and exchange engagement as well as institutionalizing a political discussion. Although, on the other hand—this movement has been fairly constrained and it is not yet even close to what would be regarded as a true partnership. But over time, tensions mounted around these two fronts and eroded the impact of this agreement until it eventually faded. So, it is safe to say that the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement managed only to establish a groundwork for Russian Federation — European Union relations yet did not attain whatever strategic objectives could have ever been more widely envisioned. It shows how hard that is to sustain in a world where states' interests diverge and shifting power balances jerk things around. Thus, research on this accord continues to be highly relevant not only for historical reflections of the past but also in predicting prospects of Russian–European relations against background of ongoing geopolitical turmoil and rapidly changing international landscape.

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